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TRUSTS-TOTTEN TRUSTS-Montgomery v.
Michaels, Surviving Spouse Can Reach a
Totten Account to the Extent Necessary
To Meet the Statutory Share
Mrs. Bernice Dillon Montgomery had established eight savings accounts in two Chicago area banks' during her lifetime. The terms
of the signature cards used by the banks differed, but they essentially
provided that the accounts were in the name of Mrs. Montgomery
as trustee for Andrice Fleming Michaels and Robert Dillon Fleming,
her two children by a prior marriage.'
Mrs. Montgomery died intestate on June 27, 1970, survived by her
husband, Dr. Earl Montgomery, and her two children. Dr. Montgomery
was appointed administrator of her estate and filed a citation proceeding in the Lake County Probate Court, individually and as administrator, seeking to discover and recover the funds in the eight accounts.'
In his petition he contended that the trusts were illusory, invalid, and
a fraud on his statutory right to one-third of the decedent's estate4
as well as his right to a surviving spouse's award. 5 Citation writs
were issued and served upon the banks and beneficiaries whereupon
the signature cards, ledger sheets, and passbooks of the accounts were
admitted into evidence. During the hearing, petitioner testified that
he had been married to the decedent for twenty-seven years prior to
her death and that he had learned of the existence of the eight savings
1. Four accounts were opened at the First National Bank of Chicago and four
at the First National Bank of Highland Park.
2. The four accounts at the First National Bank of Chicago included two in Mrs.
Montgomery's name as trustee payable on death to Andrice Michaels, totalling
$16,552.15, and two other accounts identical in form except payable on death to Robert

Fleming, also totalling $16,552.15. The four accounts at the First National Bank of
Highland Park included one in Mrs. Montgomery's name as trustee payable on death
to Robert Fleming in the amount of $6,033.74, a similar account payable on death to

Andrice Michaels in the amount of $6,033.75, a third account in Mrs. Montgomery's
name as "trustee for Robert Fleming" in the amount of $8,822.98 and a fourth account
identical to the third account except in trust for Andrice Michaels in the amount of
$8,822.98.
3. The proceeding was pursuant to ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 183 (1973).
4. Id. § 11. See note 39 infra.
5. Id. § 178.

1974

Case Comments

accounts only after her death. 6 Montgomery further testified that the
accounts represented virtually all of her property.7
The beneficiaries then filed a motion to dismiss which was granted.
The court's dismissal order held that the trusts were not illusory and
directed the banks to pay the decedent's funeral bills and to distribute
the remaining funds in the account to the named beneficiaries.' The
dismissal order was appealed to the appellate court, second district,
which affirmed the decision.9 On January 26, 1973, the Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part,10 finding that
the trial court's decision as to the payment of funeral expenses was
proper. However, the court also held that the balance in each
account was to be treated as property of the decedent for determining the spouse's statutory share and could be reached for debts,
claims 1 and the statutory share to the extent that funds from the decedent's estate were insufficient. 2 While recognizing the general validity of such savings account trusts'3 as inter vivos trusts, the court
held that they were illusory as to a surviving spouse.
Petitions for rehearing were filed by the appellees as well as by
the Chicago Bar Association,'1 4 the Illinois Corporate Fiduciaries Association and the First National Bank of Chicago as amici curiae. After
6. In re Estate of Montgomery, 2 Ill. App. 3d 821, 826, 277 N.E.2d 739, 742
(1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 54 Ill. 2d 532, 301 N.E.2d 465 (1973).
7. The remainder of decedent's possessions consisted of a checking account of
$673.36 in joint tenancy with her two children and personal effects valued at $650.00.
Brief for Appellant at 8, Montgomery v. Michaels, 54 Ill. 2d 532, 301 N.E.2d 465
(1973). The marital domicile was held in joint tenancy by Dr. and Mrs. Montgomery.
Brief for Appellee at 7, Montgomery v. Michaels, 54 Ill. 2d 532, 301 N.E.2d 465
(1973). Appellants in their reply brief denied this fact on the ground that by appellees' motion to dismiss the petition to discover assets, they admitted that the only assets
were the eight savings accounts and the personal effects valued at $650.00. Apparently
both parties were concerned that the court might follow jurisdictions which take into
consideration the extent to which the surviving spouse was deprived of his or her interest in the decedent's estate as a factor in determining whether the savings account trusts
were real or illusory. E.g., Mushaw v. Mushaw, 183 Md. 511, 39 A.2d 465 (1944);
Whittington v. Whittington, 205 Md. 1, 106 A.2d 72 (1954); Rose v. St. Louis Union
Trust Co., 43 Ill. 2d 312, 253 N.E.2d 417 (1969) (decided under Missouri law).
In these jurisdictions, the value of a home held in joint tenancy or tenancy by the
entirety is included for the purpose of determining the value of the decedent's estate.
E.g., Kloslewski v. Slovan Bldg. and Loan Ass'n, 247 Md. 82, 230 A.2d 285, 288 n.ll
(1967); 43 Ill. 2d at 317, 253 N.E.2d at 317.
8. In re Estate of Montgomery, 2 Ill. App. 3d 821, 277 N.E.2d 739 (1972).
9. Id.
10. Montgomery v. Michaels, Civil No. 45031 (Ill. Sup. Ct., filed Jan. 26, 1973),
modified on denial of rehearing, 54 Ill. 2d 532, 301 N.E.2d 465 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Montgomery, January opinion].
11. The court said such claims would include a surviving spouse's award, if appropriate, pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 178 (1973), and administrative expenses,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 202 (1973), but specifically excluded the payment of legacies.
12. Montgomery, January opinion, supra note 10, at 4.
13. The decision dealt specifically with the type of savings account trust known
as a Totten trust. See note 16 infra.
14. The Chicago Bar Association was subsequently joined in its petition and amicus
curiae brief by the Illinois State Bar Association.
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an unusual delay the Illinois Supreme Court on September 27, 1973,
denied a rehearing but used the opportunity to modify the opinion it
had filed on January 26, 1973.1'
THE SAVINGS ACCOUNT TRUST DEVICE IN ILLINOIS

The use of savings account trusts' in Illinois was first recognized
by the state legislature in the early 1920's when the General Assembly
passed laws designed to protect banks' 7 and savings and loan institutions' 8 from liability when they paid the account to the named beneficiary upon death of the depositor-trustee. In 1965, Illinois judicially
recognized the Totten 9 savings account trust as a valid inter vivos trust
in In re Estate of Petralia.'° In Petralia,the beneficiary of a Totten
trust established by the decedent brought a citation proceeding against
The modifi15. Montgomery v. Michaels, 54 Ill. 2d 532, 301 N.E.2d 465 (1973).
cations are discussed on pp. 701-03 inlra.
16. The term "savings account trust" is used generically. It encompasses formal
trust agreements of the account res and simple signature card agreements such as those
used by savings and loan associations and banks, including the "X as trustee for Y"
form of the tentative or Totten trust. The distinction between these types of savings
account trusts is discussed in In re Estate of Anderson, 69 Il. App. 2d 352, 217 N.E.2d
444 (1966). Unfortunately, the supreme court in Montgomery used the terms "savings
account trust" and "Totten trust" interchangeably. See note 105 infra.
17. The original bank statute was enacted in 1921 and is currently found in ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 16 , § 145 (1973). The provision was amended by the 78th General
Assembly as a result of the decision in Montgomery. The statute has not been interpreted in Illinois, though other jurisdictions with analogous provisions have held it to
be a protection from liability for banks and not legislative recognition of the validity
of such dispositions. See 1 SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 58.3 at 530-31 & n.7 (3d
ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as ScoTT]; 1 BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 47 at 359-62 & n.80 (2d ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as BOGERT]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58, comment f (1959).
18. The provision for the protection of savings and loan associations is now found
For discussion of this statute see Comment,
at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 770 (1973).
The Savings Account Trust-Validity Under Illinois Law, 23 U. Cm. L. REv. 301
(1956).
19. The Totten or tentative trust derives its title from the New York decision of
In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748, 752 (1904), which defined the trust as:
A deposit by one person of his own money in his own name as trustee
for another, standing alone, does not establish an irrevocable trust during the
lifetime of the depositor. It is a tentative trust merely, revocable at will, until
the depositor dies or completes the gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal
act or declaration, such as delivery of the passbook or notice to the beneficiary. In case the depositor dies before the beneficiary without revocation, or
some decisive act or declaration of disaffirmance, the presumption arises that
an absolute trust was created as to the balance on hand at the death of the
depositor.
20. 32 11. 2d 134, 204 N.E.2d 1 (1965).
It should be noted that savings account trusts have been the subject of litigation in
Illinois prior to Petralia. Helfrich's Estate v. Comm'r, 143 F.2d 43 (7th Cir. 1944)
(evidence established that the trusts were irrevocable); Albert v. Albert, 334 Ill. App.
440, 80 N.E.2d 69 (1948) (irrevocable trusts created); In re Estate of Hauser, 40 Ill.
App. 2d 150, 189 N.E.2d 370 (1963) (Probate Court in citation proceedings empowered to order payment to the beneficiary of a savings and loan account, the validity
of which was admitted); In re Estate of Joseph, 30 111. App. 2d 492, 175 N.E.2d 265
(1961) (valid irrevocable trust established).
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the administrator of the estate, claiming title to the balance in the
account. The administrator contended that the mere completion of
the signature card was insufficient to establish the depositor's intent

to create a trust and that the account was an attempted testamentary
2
disposition in violation of the wills statute. 1
The supreme court adopted section 58 of the Restatement (Second)
of Trusts (1959) as the rule in Illinois. 22 The court said there was
sufficient evidence to prove that the depositor intended to create a
revocable trust 23 and, while recognizing the extensive powers to revoke and control reserved by the depositor-trustee, held that the trust

was not significantly different from other revocable inter vivos trusts
which have been upheld as non-testamentary. 24
While decisions such as Petralia in Illinois and similar holdings
in other jurisdictions 25 have held the Totten trust to be a valid inter
vivos disposition, it is clearly a testamentary device and is valid only
because of a public policy unenunciated by the courts. It has been
21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 43 (1973):
Signing and Attestation.
Every will by which any real or personal estate is devised or bequeathed
shall be reduced to writing, shall be signed by the testator or by some person
in his presence and by his direction, and shall be attested in the presence
of the testator by two or more credible witnesses.
22. Section 58. Tentative Trust of Savings Deposit.
Where a person makes a deposit in a savings account in a bank or other savings organization in his own name as trustee for another person intending
to reserve a power to withdraw the whole or any part of the deposit at any
time during his lifetime and to use as his own whatever he may withdraw,
or otherwise to revoke the trust, the intended trust is enforceable by the beneficiary upon the death of the depositor as to any part remaining on deposit
on his death if he has not revoked the trust.
23. While the court in Petralia did not address itself to the question of whether
the execution of a signature card alone in the form of "X as trustee for Y" creates
a presumption that the depositor's intent was to establish a revocable trust, comment
a of the Restatement § 58 says that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
execution shows sufficient intent. See BOGERT, § 47 at 339.
The comment goes on to say that evidence may be admitted to demonstrate that
the depositor did not intend to create an irrevocable trust. Other non-trust purposes
which the depositor may have for establishing the account are mentioned in Comment,
The Savings Account Trust-Validity Under Illinois Law, 23 U. CH. L. REV. 301, 30203 n.9 (1956).
For a discussion of the evidentiary aspect, see Bogert, The Creation
of Trusts by Means of Bank Accounts, 1 CORNELL L.Q. 159 (1916).
24. The court cited Farkas v. Williams, 5 Ill. 2d 417, 125 N.E.2d 600 (1955); Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 356 Ill. 612, 191 N.E. 250 (1934); Bear v. Milliken Trust,
336 Ill. 366, 168 N.E. 349 (1929); Kelly v. Parker, 181 Ill. 49, 54 N.E. 615 (1899).
In Farkas, the decedent settlor had purchased corporate stocks in his name as trustee
for "X." Each purchase was made with an accompanying declaration of trust. The
settlor retained the right to revoke and to make all investment decisions. The court
held that while the trust has a "testamentary look" it was not an attempted testamentary disposition but a valid inter vivos trust. "[T]he line should be drawn somewhere, but . . . we do not believe that point has here been reached." 5 Ill. 2d at
433, 125 N.E.2d at 609.
25. A listing of jurisdictions which have upheld Totten and other savings account
trusts is located at ScoTr § 58.3 n.5.
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aptly described as a device whereby one gives but yet retains.2 6 The
settlor-depositor, having established the account as trustee for the
named beneficiary, can proceed to withdraw any or all funds for his
own benefit (thus revoking the trust pro tanto or completely) or

change the beneficiary merely by executing a new signature card.
Only upon the death of the depositor is the beneficiary able to enjoy
his interest in the balance of the account. This would seem to conflict
with the law of trusts, which traditionally has required that an ascertainable interest pass to the beneficiary before the death of the settlor. 27 Otherwise the purported trust is a testamentary disposition of
property and invalid for failure to comply with the formality requirements of 1he wills statute. 2s Likewise it can be argued that the degree of control which the depositor-trustee retains in the trust (as in
a Totten trust) makes it testamentary and again invalid. 9
While the courts have had to stretch trust concepts to sustain the
validity of Totten trusts as a device to pass property at death, s most
26. Hayes, Illinois Dower and the "Illusory" Trust: The New York Influence, 2 DE
PAUL L. REV. 1, 12 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Hayes].
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TIusTS § 76 (1959); SCOTT § 56.6 at 473.
However, Illinois is one of the most liberal states in finding that a trust has been
established. See the cases cited in note 24 supra.
28. See note 21 supra. Normally, the execution of a trust account signature card
does not comply with the above formalities. However, most decisions sustaining the
validity of Totten trusts as valid inter vivos dispositions have held that the trust is
created at the time the account is established. At that moment the beneficiary receives
an equitable interest, the enjoyment of which is postponed until after the settlor's death.
See 32 Ill. 2d at 134, 204 N.E.2d at 3; Coughlin v. Farmers and Mechanics Savings
Bank, 199 Minn. 102, 272 N.W. 166 (1937).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS
§ 56, comment f, states:
If by the terms of the trust an interest passes to the beneficiary during the
life of the settlor, although the interest does not take effect in enjoyment or
possession before the death of the settlor, the trust is not a testamentary trust.
• . . The disposition is not testamentary and the intended trust is valid even
though the interest of the beneficiary is contingent upon the existence of a
certain state of facts at the time of the settlor's death.
Some courts have held that an interest vests in the beneficiary after the depositor's
death. See Matter of Slobiansky, 152 Misc. 232, 273 N.Y.S. 869 (1934); W. JAMES,
ILLINOIS PROBATE LAw AND PRACTICE § 43.99(g) at 86 n.20 (Supp. 1972); SCOTT
§ 58.3 at 527.
29. BOGERT § 47 at 342; SCOTT § 58.3 at 526, 527, § 57.2 at 480, 481, § 56.6.
However, it should be noted that Illinois has been liberal in finding valid trusts when
the settlor retains extensive control. See the line of cases cited in note 24 supra; Note,
Matter of Totten, An Anomaly in the Law of Trusts, 6 DE PAUL L. REV. 117 (1956);
Hayes, supra note 26, at 22.
30. BOGERT § 47 at 342; SCOTT § 58.3 at 526, 527; see Note, Matter of Totten,
An Anomaly in the Law of Trusts, 6 DE PAUL L. REV. 117 (1956); Comment,
Trusts-Savings Account or Totten Trusts Upheld in Illinois, 53 ILL. B.J. 918 (1965);
Comment, Trusts-Totten Trusts-The Rights of the Surviving Spouse and Creditors
in the Proceeds of Savings Account Trusts, 50 CHI. KENT L. REV. 159 (1973).
But see In re Jeruzal's Estate, 269 Minn. 183, 130 N.W.2d 473, 477 (1964), where
the court noted that the testamentary character of the Totten trust should render it
invalid but went on to say:
Nevertheless, courts have adopted the policy of holding these trusts valid
since they provide a method of disposing of small estates in a convenient and
reasonably fraudproof way without the formalities specified by the Probate
Code and without the expense of probate pioceedings.
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commentators have concluded that the unarticulated reason behind
such results is the convenience with which the device disposes of property."' Scott, in The Law of Trusts, states:
[I]n view of the extent of the control of the depositor over
the deposit, the trust is a very thin trust and could easily be held
to be testamentary. In view, however, of the convenience of this
method of disposing of comparatively small sums of money without the necessity of resorting to probate proceedings, there seems
to be no sufficiently strong policy to invalidate these trusts. Not
only is the amount involved usually comparatively small, but it
is easy to identify, and there is no great danger of fraudulent
claims resulting from the absence of an attested instrument.
The court's awareness of the simplicity3 2 with which the Totten trust
conveys property and its widespread use by the public3" seems to
be the preferable rationale for sanctioning the validity of the device.
This ease and widespread use underpin the public policy argument
favoring the utilization of Totten trusts. Nevertheless, if the Totten
trust can be supported by public policy arguments, it can also be
attacked by them.
TOTTEN TRUST ATTACKED BY A SURVIVING SPOUSE

A problem which did not arise in the Petralia case was the validity
31. See SCOTT § 58.3 at 527; Note, Illinois Totten Trust: The Rights of Legal Representatives of a Beneficiary Who Predeceases the Trustee, 48 CHIi. KENT L. REV. 107,
112 (1971); Comment, Trusts-Totten Trusts-The Rights of the Surviving Spouse and
Creditors in the Proceeds of Savings Account Trusts, 50 CI. KENT L. REV. 159
(1973); Comment, Trusts-Savings Account or Totten Trusts Upheld in Illinois, 53
ILL. B.J. 918 (1965).
Comment b to § 58 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS states that "Mhe
courts have upheld these trusts as a convenient method of disposing of money, and
have held the disposition is valid even though there is no compliance with the statute
of wills."
32. Although the savings account trust has been called the poor man's will, its flexibility has been utilized in many other estate planning situations. See Hefferman and
Williams, Revocable Trusts in Estate Planning, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 524 (1959); ABA,
The Revocable Living Trust as an Estate Planning Tool, 7 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE
AND TRUST JOURNAL 223 (1972).
The Totten trust's advantages over a will include the avoidance of attorney's fees,
the speed with which the property is passed, the ease with which the trust is created
and beneficiaries changed and taxation advantages.
33. The number of savings account trusts in Illinois has been estimated in the tens
of thousands. In Chicago the First National Bank of Chicago has over 20,000 Totten
trust accounts and the Harris Trust and Savings Bank and the Northern Trust Company each have over 7,000 such accounts. Petition for Rehearing of the Chicago Bar
Association and the Illinois State Bar Association as Amicus Curiae at 11, 54 Ill.2d
532, 301 N.E.2d 465 (1973). In 1961, an Illinois appellate court noted that:
There must be hundreds of individual trust accounts in Chicago banks which
have used this or similar forms. Countless depositors, who have the right
to make withdrawals at will and to close out their accounts have designated
themselves as trustees in the belief that the beneficiary named by them will
receive whatever balance remains in their accounts at their death. That so
few cases involving these accounts have reached our reviewing courts is surprising and is evidence of their general acceptance.
In re Joseph's Estate, 30 IU. App. 2d 492, 493, 175 N.E.2d 265, 266 (1961).
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of the Totten trust under attack by a surviving spouse34 who is putatively protected by public policy. Since the abolition of dower in
Illinois"3 (and prescinding the possibility of a homestead estate3 6 or
a surviving spouse's award 3 7), the only property rights of a surviving
spouse are the statutory marital rights under the provisions of section
11 or 16 of the Probate Act. 8 Section 11 provides that the surviving
spouse of an intestate decedent is entitled to either one-third or all
of the decedent's probate estate, depending upon whether the decedent has surviving descendants.3 9 Under section 16 a spouse who has
renounced ° the decedent's will takes one-third of the probate estate
or one-half if there is no descendant. 1
Unlike dower, which was essentially an indefeasible interest in all
real estate owned by the decedent during marriage, 42 the statutory
marital rights of a surviving spouse are in both real and personal property owned by the decedent at death. While it was the legislature's
intention to provide for the surviving spouse,43 these interests have
34. The contestant in Petraliawas the administrator of the depositor's estate.
35. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 18 (1973), states: "There is no estate of dower or
curtesy. All inchoate rights to elect to take dower existing on the effective date of
this amendatory act are hereby extinguished." The statute became effective January
1, 1972.
36. Id. ch. 52, § 1 (1973).
37. Id. ch. 3, § 178.
38. Id. § 1 et seq.
39. The relevant portions of § 11 are:
Rules of Descent and Distribution. The intestate real and personal property
of a resident decedent . . . after all just claims against his estate are fully
paid, descends and shall be distributed as follows:
(1) If there is a surviving spouse and also a descendant of the decedent:
one-third of the entire estate to the surviving spouse and two-thirds to
the decedent's descendants per stirpes.
(2)
If there is a surviving spouse but no descendants of the decedent: the
entire estate to the surviving spouse.
40. The method of renouncing the testator's will is set out in § 17 of the Probate
Act. See note 102 infra.
41. § 16. Share of Spouse on Renunciation of Will.
When a will is renounced by the testator's surviving spouse in the manner
provided in Section 17, whether or not the will contains any provision for
the benefit of the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse is entitled to the following share of the testator's estate after payments of all just claims: onethird of the entire estate if the testator leaves a descendant, or one-half of
the entire estate if the testator leaves no descendant.
42. The dower provision, Law of July 9, 1951, ch. 3, § 18 (repealed 1972), stated:
"[A] surviving spouse, whether husband or wife, may become endowed of a third part
of all real estate of which the decedent was seized during the marriage by electing
to take dower ...
"
There were several exceptions to the indefeasibility of the estate of dower, the most
common being release of the interest by the surviving spouse. For a comparison of
dower to the statutory marital rights in Illinois, see Hayes, supra note 26.
43. See In re Taylor's Will, 55 111. 252, 259 (1870), quoted in Blankenship v. Hall,
233 111. 116, 129, 84 N.E. 192, 196 (1908); Smith v. Northern Trust, 322 Ill. App.
168, 173, 54 N.E.2d 75, 77 (1944); 54 Ill. 2d at 536, 301 N.E.2d at 467: "There
has been a manifest desire on the part of the lawmakers of this state to provide for
the support of the wife, not only during the lifetime of the husband but also after
his death."
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been regarded as mere expectancies in the estate of the decedent."
Sections 11 and 16 place the surviving spouse on a par with descendants and other relatives of the decedent45 and subject the probate
estate to all debts the decedent had incurred. Therefore, a decedent
who wanted to minimize the intestate or renunciation share of his
spouse could reduce the amount of property in his estate at death by
transferring it outright or in trust to another during his lifetime.4 6
Naturally surviving spouses have attacked these conveyances as
attempts to deprive them of their distributive share. Regardless of
the outcome of such contests, the decisions have been premised on
the common law principle of free alienability of property.
In Padfield v. Padfield the Illinois Supreme Court reiterated:
[T]here can be no doubt of the power of a husband to dispose of his property during his life, independently of the concurrence, and exonerated from the claim of his wife, provided that
the transaction is not merely colorable, and be unattended with
circumstances indicative of fraud upon the rights of the wife. If
the disposition of the husband be bona fide, and no right is reserved to him, though
made to defeat the right of the wife, it will
47
be good against her.

As indicated in Padfield and subsequent Illinois decisions, the fact
that the decedent's only motive in transferring property was to deprive
the surviving spouse of his statutory marital rights is immaterial." The
only qualification on the right is that the disposition be absolute and
not a colorable attempt to retain control over the property.4"
44. Illinois decisions have not distinguished between the statutory marital rights of
the surviving spouse. The § 16 renunciation share and the intestate succession share
have been treated as equally defeasible. See In re Taylor's Will, 55 Ill. 252, 260
(1870); note 85 infra; Hayes, supra note 26, at 11, 22; Comment, Trusts-Savings Account or Totten Trusts Upheld in Illinois, 53 ILL. B.J. 918, n.17 (1965).
45. See, e.g., Patterson v. McClenathan, 296 I11. 475, 481, 129 N.E. 767, 770
(1921). See also Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Jackson, 412 111.
261, 270, 106 N.E.2d
188, 192 (1952); Cahill v. Cahill, 402 I11. 416, 426, 84 N.E.2d 380, 386 (1949): Ness
v. Lunde, 394 Ill. 286, 292-93, 68 N.E.2d 458, 461 (1946); Bundy v. Solon, 384 Il1.
137, 143, 51 N.E.2d 183, 187 (1943).
See Hayes, supra note 26, at 26, 27 & n.73
(1952).
46. For an excellent discussion of devices used to defeat marital rights, see Hayes,
supra note 26; Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 14 (1971); 49 A.L.R.2d 521 (1956); 157 A.L.R.
1184 (1945); 112 A.L.R. 649 (1938); 64 A.L.R. 466 (1929).
47. 78 111. 16, 18 (1875).
48. 54 Ill. 2d at 535-36, 301 N.E.2d at 466; Haskell v. Art Institute of Chicago,
304 I11. App. 393, 398-99, 26 N.E.2d 736, 739 (1940); Padfield v. Padfield, 78 I!1.
16, 18 (1875); Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 14 (1971). But see In re Estate of Montgomery,
2 II1. App. 3d 824, 825, 277 N.E.2d 739, 742 (1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 54
Ill. 2d 532, 301 N.E.2d 465 (1973); Burnet v. First Nat'l Bank, 12 111. App. 2d 514,
528, 140 N.E.2d 362, 369 (1957); Rose v. St. Louis Union Trust, 43 11. 2d 312, 316,
253 N.E.2d 417, 419 (1969) (decided under Missouri law); Comment, Mann, Totten
Trusts Approved i~n Illinois, 53 ILL. B.J. 724, 726 (1965).
49. Id.
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There has been little question about the legitimacy of transfers by
means of the outright inter vivos gift 0 or the simple trust gift 5' to
defeat the statutory marital rights of a surviving spouse. However,
the utilization of extremely flexible inter vivos trust arrangements such
as the Totten trust has created problems for the courts when such
a transfer is attacked by a surviving spouse. The major ground of
contention is whether or not the depositor-settlor has retained so many
of the indicia of ownership5 2 during his life that the trust transfer is
illusory as to the rights of a surviving spouse.
THE MONTGOMERY DECISION
Montgomery53

marked the first time a Totten trust had been
attacked by a surviving spouse in the Illinois Supreme Court. The
court found itself confronted with two public policies in conflict: the
validity of the Totten trust as a popular method of property alienation
and the expediency of providing some financial support for surviving
spouses. In resolving the conflict, the court reviewed decisions from
jurisdictions which had previously considered the problem, analyzing
them in terms of the two traditional approaches as represented by the
positions of the courts in New York and Maryland.
In the Maryland approach,54 the reviewing court considers a number
of factors in determining whether the trust was a fraud on the surviving spouse's marital right. The circumstances taken into consideration
include: the degree to which the trusts diminished the spouse's share
of the decedent's property or other means of support; the proximity
in time of the transfer to the decedent's death; the completeness of
the transfer and extent of control retained by the settlor; whether
the trust was established openly or secretly; and the intent of both
the beneficiary and the depositor-settlor. Maryland decisions have
said that all of these considerations are material and that no one of
them should be adopted to the exclusion of the others; however, the
degree to which the widow has been deprived of the decedent's assets
appears to be the determinative factor in many of the cases. 55
While a number of jurisdictions adhere to this equitable case by
50. Padfield v. Padfield, 78 Ill. 16 (1875).
51. Patterson v. McClenathan, 296 Ill. 475, 129 N.E. 767 (1921).
52. The Totten trust has been described as the most extreme form of revocable and
controllable inter vivos trust. See note 26 supra.
53. 54 Ill. 2d 532, 301 N.E.2d 465 (1973).
54. For the clearest enunciation of the Maryland approach, see Whittington v.
Whittington, 205 Md. 1, 106 A.2d 72 (1954).
The approach has developed through a number of Maryland case decisions. See
Sturgis v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 152 Md. 654, 137 A. 378 (1927); Mushaw v. Mushaw,
183 Md. 511, 39 A.2d 465 (1944); Allender v. Allender, 199 Md. 541, 87 A.2d 608
(1952); Klosiewski v. Slovan Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 274 Md. 82, 230 A.2d 285 (1967).
55. See Mushaw v. Mushaw, 183 Md. 511, 39 A.2d 465 (1944).
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case approach,5 6 its shortcomings have been recognized even by the
Maryland courts. Determining a decedent's intent in a transaction
made during his lifetime is at best problematic, and the degree test
has been criticized as not lending itself to a precise legal criterion.'
The Illinois Supreme Court had the opportunity -to examine this
approach firsthand in deciding Rose v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.58
Applying Missouri trust law,59 the court said that the determination of
whether the particular trust in question" was a fraud on the spouse's
statutory right depended upon the surrounding circumstances."
The Illinois appellate court, in deciding the Montgomery case,6 2
apparently believed that the question should be decided under Illinois
law as mandated by the supreme court in Rose v. St. Louis Trust.
Relying on Burnet v. First National Bank,6 3 an appellate decision
which had not been followed, the second district court stated that the
mere establishment of Totten trusts by Bernice Montgomery did not
constitute a fraud on Earl Montgomery's intestate share. 4 Quoting
56. Windsor v. Leonard, 475 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Edgar v. Fitzpatrick, 369
S.W.2d 592 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 377 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. 1964).
57. The Supreme Court of Maryland in Allender v. Allender, 199 Md. 541, 87 A.2d
608, 611 (1952), pointed out:
It must be admitted, however, that the test of degree does not commend itself
as a legal criterion. If the wife receives less than her legal share in the personal estate, it would seem to be quite immaterial that she is not wholly cut
off, that she receives her dower rights in the real estate, or that she has resources of her own.
In Whittington v. Whittington, 205 Md. 1, 14, 106 A.2d 72, 78 (1954), the court states:
No general and completely satisfactory rule to determine the validity or invalidity of transfers alleged to be in fraud of marital rights has yet been evolved
in this State. The test of degree has been recognized, and so have its shortcomings. It remains a very practical consideration among the facts and circumstances to be considered in connection with the completeness and genuineness of a transfer where the transferor, by naming himself as trustee . . .
has retained some control over the subject of the gift -r trust under scrutiny.
For an analysis of the Maryland approach, see Sykes, Inter Vivos Transfers in Violation of the Rights of Surviving Spouses, 10 MD. L. REV. 1 (1949).
For a criticism of both the Maryland and New York approaches, see In re Jeruzal's
Estate, 269 Minn. 183, 130 N.W.2d 473, 477 (1964).
58. 43 Ii. 2d 312, 253 N.E.2d 417 (1969).
59. The Missouri law was applicable since the trust res was located in a Missouri
bank and the trust agreement provided that it was to be governed under Missouri law.
60. The trust in question was not a Totten trust but an irrevocable trust of money
deposited in a St. Louis bank with the bank as trustee. It was similar to a Totten
trust in that the settlor retained control over the deposit, retaining a life estate and
what the trustee-bank described as a right of "courtesy consultation."
61. Missouri law follows the Maryland approach. See Edgar v. Fitzpatrick, 396
S.W.2d 592 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 377 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. 1964).
Recognizing that this was the proper approach, the Illinois Supreme Court remanded
Rose for application of the test, stating that the record did not contain sufficient evidence of the various circumstances.
62. In re Estate of Montgomery, 2 I11. App. 3d 821, 277 N.E.2d 739 (1972).
63. Burnet v. First Nat'l Bank, 12 Ill. App. 2d 514, 140 N.E.2d 362 (1957). But
see Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 Il. App. 168, 54 N.E.2d 75 (1955), followed
in Dennis v. Dennis, 132 I11. App. 2d 952, 271 N.E.2d 55 (1971); Holmes v. Mims,
1 111. 2d 274, 115 N.E.2d 790 (1953).
64. In re Estate of Montgomery, 2 Ill. App. 3d 821, 825, 277 N.E.2d 739, 742
(1972).
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from Burnet, the court said: "Whether the form of trust employed
is merely colorable and illusory, and a fraud upon the marital rights
of the spouse, must be determined from the particular facts in each
65
case."

However, the Supreme Court of Illinois, seizing upon the intent factor, 6 rejected the multi-consideration approach in Montgomery. Instead, the court recognized that prior decisions in Illinois have held
that the decedent's intent in transferring property is immaterial, noting
the inherent difficulties in determining the motives of a deceased person. 67
After rejecting the Maryland solution, the Montgomery court discussed the New York approach and its progeny in other jurisdictions.6
A discussion of the New York cases is worthy of attention since a
somewhat analogous case development evolved in Illinois and because
the court cites several of these decisions in its opinion. 9
In Newman v. Dore7 0 a surviving spouse contested the validity of
a trust on the grounds that the extensive control reserved by the decedent rendered it testamentary and in violation of her statutory share
on renunciation. Although the device utilized was not a Totten trust,
the trust agreement reserved to the settlor most of the same rights
and powers which the depositor-settlor of a Totten trust retains. 7 1 In
65. Id., quoting Burnet v. First Nat'l Bank, 72 Il1. App. 2d 514, 528, 140 N.E.2d
362, 369 (1957).
66. The supreme court's interpretation of the multi-factor approach in Rose v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co. is questionable. In determining whether a trust is a fraud upon
the surviving spouse under this approach, the intent of the decedent is but one of several circumstances to be considered. The myriad of attendant circumstances listed by
the court as revealing the intent of the deceased are to be weighted equally in determining whether the trust is a fraud on the statutory rights of the surviving spouse. As
the supreme court stated in Rose:
Factors emphasized in determining whether there was a fraud on marital
rights are the intent to defraud, the proximity in time between the transfer
and the testator's death, the proportion of the settlor's property transferred
to the trust, the absence of consideration, and the fairness to the wife if the
trust is operative. . . . In the case before us . . .the provisions of the trust
. . . reflect an intention to give the bulk of the estate to his children.
However, since the record is devoid of evidence as to the amount of property
• . . held in joint tenancy, and how much of decedent's total assets were
placed in trust the case must be remanded. On remand, it should be ascertained whether decedent had a fraudulent intent, what portion of decedent's
total property was available to his widow, and all other factors deemed operative by the Missouri courts in determining whether the trust was in fraud of
plaintiffs marital rights should be considered.
43 Ill. 2d 312, 316, 253 N.E.2d 417, 419-20 (1969) (decided under Missouri law).
67. 54 Ill. 2d at 535-36, 301 N.E.2d at 466-67.
68. For a state-by-state discussion of decisions involving the use of trusts to impair
surviving spouse's rights, see Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 14 (1971).
69. For a thorough analysis of New York and Illinois decisions see Hayes, supra
note 26. See also Note, Illusory Transfers in New York, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 258
(1951).
70. 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
71. The trust agreement provided that the settlor had reserved the right to income
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deciding for the surviving spouse, the court announced what has become known as the New York or "reality" test. The court stated that
the settlor's motive was immaterial and held that the only test of validity is whether the transfer is real or illusory."2 The critical determination is whether the transfer was in good faith and has divested the
decedent of the property or has merely masked his effective retention
of the property. Although there was a question as to whether the
New York Court of Appeals found that the trust was entirely illusory
or only illusory as to a surviving spouse, a number of subsequent decisions have accepted it as holding that the revocable and controllable
trust used was valid under the law of trusts but illusory as to a surviv.ing spouse. 73
The Newman reality test was logically extended to the Totten trust
in Krause v. Krause.74 This decision reaffirmed the general validity
of the Totten trust", but also held it was illusory as to the surviving
spouse. However, the decision in In re Halpern's Estate6 casts doubt
on the generally accepted understanding of Newman. It strongly suggested7 7 that the devices in Newman and Krause were not valid trusts
but that if the trust is a reality under the law of trusts, it would also be
valid against the claims of a surviving spouse. While expressing regret
that a surviving spouse's statutory marital right could be defeated by
a valid Totten trust, the court said it was the legislature's duty to protect the spouse from such transfers. In response to Halpern and deciof the trust as long as he lived, the right to revoke the trust at will and complete
control over the trustee's administration of the trust during his lifetime.
72. While there was conclusive evidence that the purpose of the trust agreement
was to deprive the surviving spouse of any rights in the decedent's property, the court
stated:
Motive or intent is an unsatisfactory test of the validity of a transfer of property ....

Since the law gives the wife only an expectant interest in the

property of her husband which becomes part of his estate, and since the law
does not restrict transfers of property by the husband during his life, it would
seem that the only sound test of the validity of a challenged transfer is
whether it is real or illusory. . . . Reality, not appearance, should determine
legal rights.
275 N.Y. at 379-80, 9 N.E.2d at 968-69.
73. Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 172 Misc. 290, 14 N.Y.S.2d 375 (Sur. Ct. 1939),
modified on other grounds, 260 App. Div. 174, 21 N.Y.S.2d 232 (2d Dep't 1940),
discussed in Hayes, supra note 26. at 17.

74. 285 N.Y. 27, 32 N.E.2d 779 (1941).
75. New York was the first jurisdiction to uphold the validity of the Totten trust
in In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
76. 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951).
77. The question of the validity of the Totten trust as against the surviving spouse
was not directly before the New York Court of Appeals. The appellate division had
decided that the Totten trust failed only to the extent that it was necessary to give
the surviving spouse her statutory share. The spouse appealed but the beneficiary of
the trust did not. The court of appeals held that the surviving spouse was not entitled
to the full amount in the account, and since the beneficiary did not appeal, affirmed
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sions which followed it,7 8 New York enacted legislation which protected 'the surviving spouse from savings account trusts and other testa79
mentary substitutes.

After the Newman and Krause decisions, but before In re Halpern's
Estate, the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, was confronted
with a surviving spouse's attack on the validity of a revocable and controllable inter vivos trust"0 as a device to deprive her of her intestate
share. The court's decision in Smith v. Northern Trust Co."' followed
Newman holding that the transfer was illusory and could not deprive
the surviving spouse of her statutory share. However, as in Newman,
the appellate court did not clearly state whether the trust was illusory
as a whole or illusory only in respect to the surviving spouse.
After the validity of the Totten trust was recognized in Petralia,
commentators speculated as to how Illinois would decide when the
Totten trust was attacked by a surviving spouse: whether it would extend Smith v. Northern Trust Co. and hold the trust illusory as to the
surviving spouse or adopt In re Halpern and hold the Totten trust valid
even against the surviving spouse.8 2
The Montgomery court disapproved of Halpern and decisions which
have followed it. While not mentioning the case by name, the court
quoted a passage from Scott8 3 which criticized the decision:
It would seem that a strong argument could be made against
this result, on the ground that it violates the policy of the statute
which gives a distributive share of the decedent's estate to the surviving spouse. It is true that it is generally held that the creation
of a revocable trust is sufficient to cut out the surviving spouse,
the appellate division decision. Its suggestion that the beneficiary could have prevailed
had she appealed was dictum.
78. See, e.g., In re Purcell, 200 Misc. 643, 107 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1951).
79. NEW YoRK DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 18(a) (1965), as amended, N.Y. ANNOT.
E.P.T.L. §§ 5-1.1 (McKinney 1967), provides prospectively (after Aug. 31, 1966) that
Totten trusts, their savings and loan counterparts, gifts causa mortis, trusts created by
the decedent in which he reserved a power of revocation and property held by the
decedent and others in joint tenancy with right of survivorship created by him and
held at the time of his death, are to be treated as testamentary substitutes for the purpose of election by the surviving spouse.
80. The provisions of the trust agreement in Smith v. Northern Trust Co. were similar to those involved in Newman v. Dore. See note 71 supra. The settlor reserved
a life estate in the income and if it became insufficient to support the standard of
living to which he was accustomed, the right to invade the principal, the right to veto
the trustee's acts in administration of the trust and the power to alter, amend, or revoke
the agreement.
81. 322 Ill. App. 168, 54 N.E.2d 75 (1944).
82. See Hayes, supra note 26; Comment, Trusts-Totten Trust-Initial Illinois
Recognition, 15 DE PAUL L. REV. 240 (1965); Comment, Mann, Totten Trusts Approved in Illinois, 53 ILL. B.J. 724 (1965); Comment, The Savings Account TrustValidity Under Illinois Law, 23 U. CHi. L. REV. 301 (1956).
83. Scorr § 58.5 at 546, 547.
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at least if the settlor does not reserve too great a control over
the property. In the case of the savings-deposit trust, however,
the depositor reserves such complete control that it would seem
that, even though the trust is valid as against the personal representative of the depositor, it should not be valid as against the
surviving spouse. Certainly the policy underlying the statute protecting the surviving spouse is stronger than the policy underlying
the statute providing for certain formalities to evidence a testamentary disposition. It may well be held that the creation of a
savings-deposits4 trust is valid but not effective to cut out the surviving spouse.
The court cited with approval the reality test of Newman v. Dore as
applied to Totten trusts in Krause v. Krause and concluded that despite the general validity of the Totten trust, it was illusory as to Dr.
Montgomery and could not deprive him of his statutory share. 5
The court's reliance on the New York decision in Newman raises
the question of why the court's published opinion of September 27,
1973, does not mention Newman's Illinois counterpart, Smith v.
Northern Trust Co. A reference to Smith appeared in the original
opinion of January 26, 1973, immediately following the court's discussion of Newman."6 Citing Smith and two other Illinois decisions, the
deleted paragraph read: "The courts in our State have reached a similar result but the rationale has been that the conveyance was illusory
'7
and the attendant circumstances were indicative of fraud. ,
Why this section was edited out of its opinion handed down on denial of rehearing is not clear. it may merely reflect a reluctance on
the part of the supreme court to cite an appellate level decision as
authority. More likely, the modification may have been an attempt
by the court to preclude any interpretation of its opinion which would
84. 54 Ii. 2d at 537, 301 N.E.2d at 467-68 (1973).
85. Id. at 537, 301 N.E.2d at 468.
It should be noted that, while Dr. Montgomery's share was an intestate share, the
decision is also applicable to a share on renunciation. The court compared the question in this case to that of the statutory policy of permitting a surviving spouse to renounce the decedent's will and share in the proceeds.
New York decisions originally made a distinction between the intestate and renunciation share, holding that a surviving spouse entitled to a renunciation share could reach
the Totten trust, while the intestate share, as a mere expectancy, could not be reached.
Murray v. Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 258 App. Div. 132, 15 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1st Dep't 1939).
Later decisions protected both statutory rights. Burns v. Turnbull, 294 N.Y. 889, 62
N.E.2d 785 (1945); Steixner v. Bowery Sav. Bank, 86 N.Y.S.2d 747 (S. Ct. 1949).
See note 44 supra.
86. Montgomery, January opinion, supra note 10, at 3.
87. Id. This paragraph would have appeared in the published opinions as the first
full paragraph on 54 111. 2d at 537, and the second full paragraph on 301 N.E.2d at
467.
The other cases cited were: Padfield v. Padfield, 78 11. 16 (1875) (see text accompanying note 47); and Holmes v. Mims, 1 111. 2d 274, 115 N.E.2d 790 (1953).
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suggest that the protection of a surviving spouse's marital right depends upon the difficult question of fraudulent intent. ss It appears
that the logic behind Newman and Smith is the same: that both decisions turned on the extensive controls retained by the settlor and not
on attendant circumstances indicative of fraud. The Montgomery
opinion clearly states that in light of the numerous controls and enjoyment retained by the decedent, the statutory policy of protecting a
surviving spouse's statutory share should prevail, regardless of the
settlor-depositor's intent in creating the trust account.8 9
While the Illinois Supreme Court applied the Newman reality test
to determine that the trust was illusory as to the surviving spouse, it
did not follow the Newman decision and invalidate the entire trust.
Rather, the court adopted what is in fact the Restatement (Second)
of Trusts' position.9 0 It held that although the savings account balances
were to be included in the decedent's estate for calculating the surviving spouse's statutory share, the funds would be available only to the
extent that the general assets of the estate were inadequate to provide
that share. The remaining balances were to be distributed to the
beneficiaries. 9
The supreme court in Montgomery also addressed itself to the right
of creditors to reach funds in a Totten trust account. Affirming the
trial court's ruling that trust funds could be reached to pay funeral
expenses if assets in the general estate were inadequate," the court
88. Several of the petitions for rehearing expressed disfavor with the Newman reality test, alleging that the test in Illinois is whether the settlor-depositor had a fraudulent
intent in establishing the trust (see note 110 infra).
89. 54 Ill. 2d at 536, 301 N.E.2d at 467.
90. Id. at 539, 301 N.E.2d at 468.
While the court did not refer to comment e of § 58 of the Restatement (Second)
of Trusts (1959), its holding is in agreement with it. Comment e reads:
Although the surviving spouse in claiming his or her statutory distributive
share of the estate of the decedent is not entitled to include in the estate
property transferred during his lifetime by the decedent in trust for himself
for life with remainder to others, even though the decedent reserves a power
of revocation (see § 57, Comment c), the surviving spouse of a person who
makes a savings deposit upon a tentative trust can include the deposit in computing the share to which such surviving spouse is entitled.
Although the amount which the surviving spouse is entitled to receive is
measured by the sum of the decedent's owned assets and the amount of such
deposits, the owned assets are to be first applied to the satisfaction of the
claim of the surviving spouse. The situation is somewhat similar to that in
which creditors seek to reach the estate of a decedent who has by will exercised a general power of appointment.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58, at 158-59.
91. 54 Ill. 2d at 538-39, 301 N.E.2d at 468.

92. The question of creditors' rights was not put before the supreme court by either
of the litigants. From an examination of the excerpts from the record, the trial court
order and briefs of the parties, it appears that no creditors of Mrs. Montgomery were
involved. The trial court did, however, order the payment of funeral expenses
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also added expenses of administration and debts owed creditors of the
depositor as amounts collectable from trust funds.9 3 In its January
opinion the court supported this holding with several New York decisions because there were no Illinois decisions on the question.9 4 The
court buttressed its decision as to creditors by adding to its September
opinion a comment from the Restatement (Second) of Trusts.9 5 The
Restatement takes the position that creditors of the settlor-depositor
can reach the Totten trust account since the extensive powers reserved
by the deceased over the account justify treating him as the unrestricted owner of the deposit.9 6
By following the Restatement approach, the Montgomery court
was able to balance the two public policies before it. On one hand,
it recognized the policy against leaving a surviving spouse in destitu($1,320.28) out of the trust funds, since it appears that their payment from the assets
of the general estate would have left less than $3.00.
93. 54 Ill. 2d at 538, 301 N.E.2d at 468. The court specifically stated that the
accounts were not chargeable with the payment of legacies.
94. The court cited In re Will of Morton, 61 Misc. 2d 624, 305 N.Y.S.2d 555, 557
(Sur. Ct. 1969), and In re Reich's Estate, 146 Misc. 616, 262 N.Y.S. 623, 628 (Sur.
Ct. 1933). In New York creditors of the decedent are permitted to reach the deposit
on the ground of the depositor's absolute right of disposition of the funds during life.
Also see In re Halbauer's Estate, 34 Misc. 2d 458, 228 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sur. Ct. 1962),
afj'd mer., 18 App. Div. 2d 966, 238 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1963); Beakes Dairy Co. v.
Berns, 128 App. Div. 137, 112 N.Y.S. 529 (1908). Estate creditors, such as the funeral home, and the executor or administrator can reach the funds on the theory that
the presumption of absolute trust upon death is rebutted to the extent of their claims.
See In re Reich's Estate for a discussion of this and other theories concerning the
claims of creditors; Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 486, 498, n.2 (1972).
Unlike New York, Illinois and several other jurisdictions have held that the trust
arises and the beneficiary takes his interest at the time the account is established. Austin Fleming, in the supplement to 2 JAMES, ILLINOIS PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE 43.99
(g) (Supp. 1972), points out that in such a case, the rights of creditors would seem
to turn on whether the account was established with a fraudulent intent. See Gross
v. Douglas State Bank, 261 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Kan. 1965); Comment, Trusts-Totten
Trusts-The Right of the Surviving Spouse and Creditors in the Proceeds of Savings
Account Trusts, 50 CHI. KENT L. REV. 159, 167 (1973). But see note 96 infra.
95. 54 111.2d at 538. 301 N.E.2d at 468.
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58; comment d (1959), provides:
Although creditors of the settlor cannot reach the trust property merely because he has reserved a power of revocation (see § 330, Comment o), creditors of a person who makes a savings deposit upon a tentative trust can reach
his interest, since he has such extensive powers over the deposit as to justify
treating him as in substance the unrestricted owner of the deposit. So also,
on the death of the depositor if the deposit is needed for the payment of his
debts, his creditors can reach it. So also, if it is needed it can be applied
to the payment of his funeral expenses and the expenses of the administration
of his estate, if he has not sufficient other property which can be applied
for these purposes.
In agreement is Scott who concludes:
Even though the trust is considered as arising when the deposit is made, the
depositor has such complete control over it that the situation is distinguishable
from the ordinary situation where a settlor merely reserves a power of revocation. In substance the deposit belongs to him as long as he lives, and it is
only just to permit his creditors to reach it.
ScoTr § 58.5 at 543. But see note 94 supra.
If the settlor-depositor makes the trust irrevocable during his life, creditors may have
a difficult time reaching the fund.
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tion. On the other, it upholds the validity of the Totten trust as a
means of property disposition, giving the beneficiaries what the settlordepositor intended to give them, except to the extent that the general
assets of the estate are insufficient to satisfy the surviving spouse's
statutory share.9 7 It also avoids the uncertainty of the Maryland ad
hoc approach and the seeming inequities of the Halpern rule.
POST-MONTGOMERY PROBLEMS

Nevertheless, the Montgomery decision has created a number of
significant problems. After the January decision was handed down,
the Chicago and Illinois State Bar Associations and several banking
concerns as amici curiae filed petitions for rehearing, seeking clarification of the court's opinion.9" One of the points on which clarification
was sought was the duty of banks holding Totten accounts on death of
the depositor-trustee.99 Although section 145 of the Illinois Banking
Act had never been interpreted, it had been assumed that banks, upon
the death of the settlor-depositor, could pay the balance to the beneficiary without liability or regard to probate of the decedent's estate. 10 0
As it turned out, clarification by the court was not necessary since
the state legislature strengthened the provision on September 5, 1973.
As amended, the section provides that upon death of the settlortrustee, the bank can pay the funds to the named beneficiary without
liability, unless prior to payment it has received a restraining order
or written notice of an adverse claim.' 0 '
97. Nevertheless, if the settlor-depositor dies intestate without living descendants,
the surviving spouse would apparently be entitled to the entire balance.
98. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
99. Petition for Rehearing of the Chicago Bar Association and the Illinois State Bar
Association as Amicus Curiae at 10, 13, 54 Ill. 2d 532, 301 N.E.2d 468; ILL. STATE
BAR CENTER, PROBATE AND TRUST NEWSLETTER, Vol.

19, no. 2 (Dec. 1972), at 4, com-

mented on the Montgomery decision:
The court made no mention of the bank's position or obligations under Section 145 of the Banking Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 16% § 145). If a bank
is required to defer payment of a totten account until payment of all items
indicated by the court, the burden and exposure to liability may be too great
to warrant acceptance of the account. . . . To turn the bank into a quasiadministrator and the trust into an informal probate proceeding does not befit
the size or importance of totten accounts and tends to destroy their usefulness as an estate planning tool in modest estates.
100. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 16 , § 145 (1971), as amended, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 16
§ 145 (1973). See note 17 supra.
101. The statute, effective as of October 1, 1973, reads essentially as follows:
Deposits in trust. If a deposit is made with a bank by one . . . [person]
in trust for another . . . as beneficiary . . . it shall be credited to the depositor . . . as trustee . . . for the beneficiary. . . . Payments may be made to
the trustee. . . . If no other notice of the existence and terms of the trust
has been given in writing to the bank, the deposit . . . may be paid in the
event of the death of the trustee . . . to the designated beneficiary. ...
A
bank which makes payment pursuant to this Section prior to receipt of written
notice of an adverse claim or a restraining order, shall . . . be released from
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Montgomery also creates a number of questions for the individual
probating the estate of a decedent who had established Totten trusts.
No instructions were given as to whether the trust is to be inventoried
in the probate court; no time limit was delineated within which
a surviving spouse must assert his interest in the Totten account;
neither was there any guidance as to whether the renunciation provisions of section 17 of the Probate Act" 2 are applicable. The court
also neglected to discuss whether balances in the accounts are to be
included in the estate for purposes of determining executors' and attorneys' fees. The answers to some of these procedural questions may
be answered by the trial court to which the case was remanded. 10 '
Otherwise, legislation will be required if the Totten trust is to retain
its usefulness as an estate planning tool.
Undoubtedly, the greatest concern which has arisen in the wake
of Montgomery is the possible application of the decision to other probate avoidance devices such as joint tenancies, payable on death accounts and United States Savings Bonds.10 4 Although the supreme
court used the term "savings account trusts," it made no attempt either
in its original opinion or on denial of rehearing' 0 to limit the effect
of its decision to Totten trusts. 10 6 It could be argued that the policy
all claims of the depositor . . . . the beneficiary , . . , the legal representatives of any depositor or beneficiary, and all other claiming under or through
a depositor or beneficiary. No bank so paying shall thereby be liable for
any estate, inheritance or succession taxes or penalties due thereon.
102. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 17 (1973):
Method of Renunciation of Will. In order to renounce a will the testator's
surviving spouse shall file at the time and place provided for herein a written
instrument signed by the surviving spouse and declaring the renunciation.
The time of filing the instrument shall be as follows: (a) within 7 months
after the admission of the will to probate or (b) within such further time
as may be allowed by the court, if, within 7 months after the admission of
the will to probate or before the expiration of any extended period, the surviving spouse files a verified petition therefor setting forth that litigation is
pending that affects the share of the surviving spouse in the estate. The place
of filing the instrument shall be in the court in which the will was admitted
to probate. The filing of the instrument is a complete bar to any claim of
the surviving spouse under the will.
103. Because the case went to the supreme court on appeal of respondents-appellees'
motion to dismiss, it was remanded to the trial court so that the respondents-appellees
could file an answer.
104. See Petition for Rehearing of the Chicago Bar Association and the Illinois
State Bar Association as Amicus Curiae at 4-8, 54 Ill. 2d 532, 301 N.E.2d 468; ILL.
STATE BAR CENTER, PROBATE AND TRUST NEWSLETTER, VOL. 19, no. 3 (March 1973);
vol. 20, no. 2 (Dec. 1973).
105. All the petitions for rehearing specifically asked the court to clarify its opinion in this respect.
106. But see In re Jeruzal's Estate, 269 Minn. 183, 130 N.W.2d 473, 477 (1964),
where the court said:
It must be kept in mind that what we say here does not apply to trusts or

gifts generally but is limited to the issue of whether savings account trusts
may be used effectively to deprive the surviving spouse of statutory marital
rights in personal property.
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of protecting a surviving spouse's statutory share as enunciated in
Montgomery is equally applicable to other arrangements by which a
decedent attempts to minimize the statutory share. Nevertheless, it
appears that decisions or statutes presently validating the use of these
devices preclude a successful attack on them by a surviving spouse using a Montgomery argument. 10 7 This creates a preposterous situation.
An individual could establish a savings account as trustee for a person
other than his spouse and effectively denude the spouse of her statutory share if the institution into which he walked was a savings and

loan association rather than a bank.'
CONCLUSION

If Illinois is primarily concerned with the protection of the surviving spouse, it is the role of the General Assembly to enunciate such
a public policy. A number of jurisdictions, as a result of significant
decisions like Montgomery, have enacted comprehensive legislation
protecting the surviving spouse.10 9 The Illinois State Bar Association
107. Series E or H bonds. Under U.S. Treasury laws, savings bonds may be issued
in co-owner form with survivorship or in sole ownership form with a designated P.O.D.
beneficiary. The validity of both forms of bonds is well established under federal and
Illinois law. For the Illinois co-owner provision, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 76, § 2(d)
(1973). While this section and federal regulations are in harmony, in case of conflict,
federal obligations are to be controlled exclusively by federal law. Free v. Bland, 369
U.S. 663 (1962).
But see Note, Spouse's Rights in Non-Probate Assets Expanded,
54 MINN. L. REV. 1029, 1047, 1051 (1970). See Levites v. Levites, 27 Ill. App. 2d
274, 169 N.E.2d 574 (1960), where it was held that the purchase of U.S. Savings
Bonds in the name of a husband and son was not a fraud on the marital rights of
the surviving spouse.
Trust Accounts in Saving and Loan Associations. The Totten trust savings and loan
counterpart and P.O.D. accounts are specially authorized by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32,
§ 770 (1973).
The validity of accounts under this section has been sustained under
attacks alleging that they are testamentary, Estate of Gubula, 81 Ill. App. 2d 378, 225
N.E.2d 646 (1967), and from the claim of a surviving spouse as a residuary taker
under a decedent's will. Johnson v. Garellick, 118 Ill. App. 2d 80, 254 N.E.2d 597
(1969).
See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 601 (1973); Estate of Schwendeman v.
St. Louis Say. & Loan Ass'n, 112 Ill. App. 2d 273, 251 N.E.2d 99 (1969).
Joint Tenancy with Right of Survivorship. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 76, § 2 (a) (1973),
allows for establishment of a bank account in joint tenancy with right of survivorship.
Section 2(b) allows shares of stock, bonds or other evidences of corporate indebtedness
to be issued in the name of two or more persons as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Section 2(c) adds to the coverage of (b) shares in savings and loans and credit
unions. See Frey v. Wubbena, 26 Ill. 2d 63, 185 N.E.2d 850 (1963).
Revocable Inter Vivos Trusts. See Dennis v. Dennis, 132 Ill. App. 2d 952, 271 N.E.
2d 55 (1971).
108. In commenting on a Minnesota statute enacted to prevent a decedent from
disinheriting the surviving spouse, the author stated: "The Minnesota statute does not
succeed fully in its purpose of preventing a person from disinheriting his spouse while
living in comfort himself. It only makes it more difficult to do." Note, Spouse's
Rights in Non-Probate Assets Expanded, 54 MINN. L. REV. 1029, 1051 (1970).
109. ABA, The Revocable Living Trust as an Estate Planning Tool, Real Property,
Probate and Trust Journal (1972), points out that the trend in many jurisdictions is
in favor of protecting the surviving spouse. See, e.g., N.Y. ANNOT. E.P.T.L. 99 5-11
(McKinney 1967).
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has proposed such a statute in an attempt to clarify the law.110 Presently, the General Assembly is considering the Uniform Probate
Code,"1 ' which, if enacted, would include property transferred during

marriage, including Totten accounts, in the augmented estate, subject
to the elective share of the surviving spouse.12
In recent years the amount of property passed by will substitutes
such as the Totten trust has increased. Since both intestate and renunciation shares are presently determined from the probate estate,
a decedent can effectively defeat the surviving spouse's statutory share.
Certainly, few would disagree that Montgomery reached a desirable
result in subordinating the Totten trust to the extent necessary to protect the surviving spouse. But in light of the problems the case raised,
it is questionable whether the protection of the surviving spouse is
not a matter more suited for comprehensive legislation than for judicial
development.
CARLTON KEVIN MCCRLNDLE

110.

Proposed Statute. Preamble. This Act expresses the intent of the General

Assembly to disapprove the application, vis-a-vis the surviving spouse, of the illusory trust doctrine to a transfer by a person during his lifetime, and to reaffirm the principle set forth in Hoeffner v. Hoeffner, 389 I11. 253, Holmes v.
Mims, 1 111. 2d 274, Frey v. Wubbena, 26 Ill. 2d 62, Dennis v. Dennis, 132 Ill.
App. 2d 952 and other decisions that such a transfer is effective in the absence of an intent to defraud the surviving spouse of such spouse's statutory
share.
Section 1. A transfer of property by a decedent during his lifetime shall,
in the absence of an intent to defraud the surviving spouse of the spouse's
statutory share, be valid and effective and not illusory as to the surviving
spouse, whether the decedent dies testate or intestate.
Section 2. This Act shall be effective on the date it becomes law and shall
apply to transfers of property made before, on or after that date.
11.
The Uniform Probate Code was introduced into the 1973 Session of the 78th
General Assembly as House Bill No. 713 and Senate Bill No. 354. On May 2, 1973,
the House version was assigned to the Interim Study Calendar, allowing the proposal
to be considered during the 1974 Session.

112.

UNIFORM PROBATE CODE

§ 2-202 (1971).

Under § 6-103, 107, creditors of

the depositor-settlor can reach the funds in the account.
The Uniform Probate Code was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and by the American Bar Association in August, 1969.
It has been adopted virtually intact in Alaska, Arizona, Idaho and North Dakota (effective July 1, 1975). In addition to Illinois, it has been introduced as legislation in
California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin.
For the view of a draftsman and proponent of the Uniform Probate Code, see Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: Blueprint for Reform in the 1970's, 2 CONN. L.
REV. 453 (1970). For a critique of the Uniform Probate Code by an Illinois attorney
see Zartman, An Illinois Critique of the Uniform Probate Code, 1970 U. OF ILL. LAW
FORum 413 (1971), and Uniform Probate Code-Policies & Prospects, 61 ILL. B.J. 428
(1973).
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